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Abstract
This paper surveys existing approaches and empirical results to estimating the
impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws on smoking behaviour, on the one hand, and on the
hospitality industry, on the other. The purpose is twofold: ﬁrst, identifying impor-
tant gaps, if any, in the literature that could be addressed in future research; second,
trying to unfold the reasons of the wide heterogeneity in the results and, as a conse-
quence, to provide an assessment of the reliability of those results.
The discussion begins with a look at the recent regulations that motivate the study of
the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws, with a special emphasis on European smoking
bans. This is followed by critical reviews of studies and approaches to estimating the
economic impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws. We can distinguish between a direct and
an indirect eﬀect of anti-smoking regulations: the direct eﬀect on smoking behavior
and the indirect eﬀect on the economic performance of the hospitality industry. The
ﬁrst review assesses those studies and approaches that have focused on the direct im-
pact on smoking behaviour. The second review analyzes estimation of the economic
impact on the hospitality industry. At the end of each of the two broad reviews, we
summarize a selection of the empirical ﬁndings. The ﬁfth section explores method-
ological diﬀerences and problems that may aﬀect the empirical analysis reviewed in
the previous sections with the purpose of shedding light on the wide heterogeneity in
the empirical ﬁndings. The concluding section asks whether the studies reviewed in
this paper place us in a better position to assess the economic impact of Clean Indoor
Air Laws.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I18; K32
Key words: smoking bans, smoking participation, smoking consumption.
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1 Introduction
Clean Indoor Air Laws have been widely used to reduce non smokers exposure to second
hand smoke as well as overall tobacco consumption. The earliest policies of this type
have been implemented in the United States as early as 1971 in order to protect second
hand smokers from exposure to air pollution from smoking. Since then, thousands of
Clean Air Indoor Air Laws have been introduced in the US at the state and local level so
that smoking is forbidden in a majority of public places, including workplaces, bars and
restaurants. Canada, Australia and the UK have followed suit, introducing smoking bans
in the public places over the eighties.
As Chaloupka and Saﬀer (1992) emphasize, these Clean Indoor Air Laws generally
prohibit smoking in health care facilities, retail stores, public transportation, indoor cul-
tural or recreational facilities, government buildings, public meeting rooms, and schools
and require restaurants to provide non-smoking sections. The most restrictive of these
laws also prohibit smoking in private work places. These private work place laws are
likely to have a much greater impact on cigarette smoking due to the length of time they
aﬀect smokers: while public place laws are likely to aﬀect the average smoker for little
more than a few hours a week, the private place laws can regulate the smoker’s behavior
for 40 or more hours each week. Therefore workplace smoking bans are likely to produce
a stronger eﬀect in comparison with smoking restrictions in recreational sites.
Smoke free workplaces not only protect non smokers, but they also create an environ-
ment that encourages smokers to cut back or quit smoking or to change habits. For this
reason restricting smoking in public places may have three diﬀerent eﬀects: (i) a reduction
in smoking participation (otherwise known as smoking prevalence), i.e. on the decision
to smoke or not; (ii) a lower tobacco consumption per continuing smoker; (iii) an impact
on the hospitality industry. The second eﬀect has been the object of study of a number
of papers and there is now a consensus on the belief that smoke-free public places are as-
sociated with lower cigarette consumption per continuing smoker. Later studies, as those
reviewed by Fichtenberg and Glantz (2002), have assessed that smoke free workplaces
reduce prevalence of smoking as well as consumption. Regarding the third eﬀect, restau-
rants and bar owners, in particular, claim that smoking restrictions would cause revenue
losses as their customers could change their habits and seek other venues where smok-
ing was unrestricted. However, the majority of scientiﬁc evidence indicates that there is
no negative impact of Clean Indoor Air policies on the hospitality industry, with a few
studies ﬁnding some positive eﬀects on local businesses (Eriksen and Chaloupka, 2007;
Scollo and Lal, 2008).
This paper reviews the impact of the implementation of Clean Indoor Air Laws on
smoking participation and on per-capita tobacco consumption. The impact on the hospi-
tality industry will also be assessed in a separate section. While a majority of the literature
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deals with the United States, a number of European Studies is also included. The focus of
this review will be on the methodological reasons that may explain the variability in the
results of the empirical works evaluating the economic impact of smoking bans, such as:
type of data, econometric techniques, variables included, with the purpose of shedding
some light on the main methodological factors, if any, driving the heterogeneity in the
empirical studies. Only peer reviewed studies will be considered located through Econ-
Lit, REPEC, SSRN, NBER, Social Science Citation Index, Current Contents, MedLine,
PsychoInfo.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 oﬀers an overview of
Clean Indoor Air Laws in industrialized countries. The impact on per-capita cigarette
consumption and on prevalence of smoking is assessed in section 3 distinguishing be-
tween studies based on survey data, on time series and on longitudinal data. Section 4
explores the literature on the economic impact on the hospitality industry. Section 5 tries
to assess the methodological diﬀerences that may explain the variability in the reported
results. Section 6 provides a discussion of the main ﬁndings of the paper and concludes.
2 Overview of Clean Indoor Air Laws
2.1 The spread of Clean Indoor Air Laws in the United States
A number of reviews has already analyzed the spread of Clean Indoor Air Laws in the US
and their economic impact (Eriksen and Chaloupka, 2007; Hopkins et al., 2001; Koh et
al., 2007; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2006; Levy and Friend, 2003;
among others). Eriksen and Chaloupka (2007) report that the earliest of these policies
was the 1973 law in Arizona that limited smoking in a number of public places. This was
followed by a Connecticut law restricting smoking in restaurants (1974) and by a Min-
nesota law that included restrictions on smoking in private workplaces (1975). California
was the ﬁrst to introduce, in the early 1980ies, local clean indoor air ordinances in San
Francisco, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego. Following California, the focus on lo-
cal municipalities spread throughout the nation. In the years following the release of the
1986 Surgeon General’s Report new federal regulations were adopted banning smoking
on domestic ﬂights of two hours or fewer and on virtually all domestic ﬂights departing
from or arriving in the US. State and local governments strengthened existing policies
and adopted new policies, including complete bans on smoking in some public venues.
At the same time, numerous private companies adopted policies governing smoking in
their workplaces. In 1998 California banned smoking in bars without separately venti-
lated smoking areas. By August 2001, 234 US communities had enacted local ordinances
that required all workplaces to be completely smoke-free. In 2002 New York City banned
smoking in bars, restaurants and virtually all other workplaces. More recently, the 2006
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Surgeon General’s Report led a growing number of states and communities to adopt com-
prehensive bans on cigarette smoking in public places and private work-sites. In some
places, these policies have included some outdoor spaces like public parks and beaches.
2.2 European Clean Indoor Air Laws
With the exception of Finland, European Clean Indoor Air Laws are relatively more re-
cent. This explains why most studies on the economic impact of cigarette bans are US
based case studies.
The Finnish Tobacco Control Act (TCA) was ﬁrst implemented in 1976 and succes-
sively amended in 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007. Since June 2007 smoking is prohibited at
workplaces in general with the exception of separately ventilated smoking rooms or in-
dividual oﬃces and has been totally banned in almost all restaurants and bars, with a
deferment until June 2009 for the few restaurants having a smoking section with a sep-
arate ventilation system. In March 2004, the Republic of Ireland implemented compre-
hensive smoke-free legislation in all workplaces, including restaurants and pubs, with no
allowance for designated smoking rooms, and few exceptions. By 2006, a number of
jurisdictions had implemented or passed legislation to implement similarly strict, 100%
smoke-free laws: Norway, New Zealand, Buthan, Uruguay; 14 US States (including the
district of Columbia); nine Canadian provinces and territories; seven Australian states and
territories as well as Scotland. Norway banned smoking after Ireland, followed shortly by
New Zealand on December 10, 2004. Italy introduced a smoking ban in enclosed public
places on January 10, 2005. Estonia had smoking banned on June 5, 2007 in all facili-
ties that serve food, including bars and nightclubs. Bar owners were allowed to provide
special rooms for smoking without food or beverage service. Each Nation of the United
Kingdom implemented a similar ban: Scotland on March 26, 2006; Wales on 02 April
2007; Northern Ireland on 30 April 2007 and England on 1 July 2007. In January 2008
France extended the already existing ban to cover bars and cafs. Denmark banned smok-
ing in clubs and restaurants on 15 August 2007, although the legislation made exemptions
for small bars and restaurants with separate smoking rooms. Sweden established a similar
ban on July 1, 2005. The Netherlands and Romania banned smoking in bars and clubs on
July 1, 2008. Spain has a law, introduced by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, which
came into force at the start of 2006 and bans smoking in workplaces. It has some restric-
tions for public spaces, such as airports and train stations, but pubs, restaurants and other
public places smaller than 100 m2 are exempted and it is left to the owner the decision to
allow smoking or not. Switzerland introduced the smoking ban in public buildings, bars
and restaurants in the Canton of Geneva on July 1, 2008, but the decision was nulliﬁed
by the country’s supreme court on 29 September 2008. In November 2008 the Bulgarian
government decided to introduce a ban on smoking in all indoor public places includ-
ing oﬃces, bars, restaurants and clubs. The ban is due to come into eﬀect on June 1,
2010. On December 9, 2008 the Greek government ratiﬁed legislation on a nationwide
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ban on smoking in enclosed working and public places, which will come into eﬀect in
July 2009. As to Germany, since September 2007, smoking is prohibited in all federal
government oﬃce buildings. This includes courthouses, the German Parliament and other
federal buildings. Smoking is banned on public transportation as well. Smoking in train
stations is allowed only in designated smoking areas. Fines for violations range from 5
to 1,000 Euros. From August 2007 to July 2008 all 16 federal states introduced smoking
bans1. Most of them allowed smoking rooms as an exception. Bavaria has introduced
the strictest curbs, enforcing a ban in beer tents as well as pubs and restaurants. Many
states won’t enforce ﬁnes for breaking the rules until a few months have passed. Eight
states, Berlin, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg Western Pomera-
nia, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein have banned smoking in public places since
January 2008.
2.3 Types of Anti-Smoking Regulations
There are at least two distinctions that should be made in classifying studies analyzing
the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws. The ﬁrst one is related to the extensiveness of
their coverage, i.e. between local versus state laws. In general, local smoking ordinances
are more comprehensive than statewide anti-smoking laws and have more enforcement
power. Moreover, the adoption of local laws may generate stronger community support
than larger scale eﬀorts thereby increasing compliance and, as a consequence, increasing
the impact on smoking behavior.2 Thus, we expect to ﬁnd stronger negative correlations
between local anti-smoking bans and cigarette smoking in comparison with state-wide
smoking bans, for given levels of compliance and enforcement. Very few studies actu-
ally control for compliance or enforcement levels3 which could make it more diﬃcult to
assess the causal relationship between smoking regulation and the variation in smoking
participation and consumption. Gallet (2007) and Carpenter (2007), however,ﬁnd that
enforcement and penalties matter little and Clean Indoor Air Laws appear to be self-
enforcing.
A second important distinction is between smoking bans in public venues and smok-
ing bans in workplaces. Clean Indoor Air Laws may restrict smoking in public and private
workplaces, or in restaurants, grocery stores, health facilities and other public places. As
emphasized earlier, workplaces bans are likely to have a much greater impact on cigarette
smoking due to the length of time they aﬀect smokers: while public place laws are likely
to aﬀect the average smoker for little more than a few hours a week, the private place
1This led many small bars’ owners to appeal against the Law to the Constitutional Court. The Court
ruled that most smoking bans were unconstitutional because they disproportionately hurt small bars and
gave options to revise the Law.
2The interested reader may refer to Fichtenberg and Glantz (2002) for a coverage of studies dealing with
local legislation.
3Carpenter (2007) is an exception; Gallet (2007) also controls for enforcement.
6
laws can regulate the smoker’s behavior for 40 or more hours each week (Chaloupka and
Saﬀer, 1992). Therefore workplace smoking bans are likely to produce a stronger eﬀect
in comparison with smoking restrictions in recreational sites. Fichtenberg and Glantz
(2002) suggest that there are no systematic diﬀerences between in the results obtained
in the workplace and population based studies, but they presumably refer to the sign of
the eﬀect of anti-smoking regulation and not to its dimension. Buddelmeyer and Wilkins
(2005), on the other hand, stress that work-site studies examine samples drawn from a
subset of the community which may be aﬀected by selection bias due to attrition. As a
consequence, work-site based studies are likely to overstate the eﬀect of smoking regula-
tion. So the expected impact of workplace smoking bans is not clear cut. A way out of
this problem could be to control for attrition in the data and to also control for the level of
compliance and enforcement of the laws.
The way anti smoking regulation is measured may change the impact of these laws on
cigarette smoking. Studies either individually categorize diﬀerent Clean Indoor Air poli-
cies or combine the laws into a single index. In the latter case, an index of restrictiveness
is used based on a classiﬁcation scheme proposed by the Surgeon General. Typically this
index is calibrated on a 0 − 1 scale, in which 0 indicates no restriction, 0.25 represents
basic restrictions (e.g. one to three designated smoking areas locations), 0.5 represent
nominal restrictions (e.g. four or more designated areas excluding private worksites and
restaurants), 0.75 represents a moderate policy (e.g. restaurants, but no private worksite
restrictions) (Levy and Friend, 2003, p.602). The ﬁrst study to adopt such restrictiveness
index was Wasserman et al.(1991). Yurekli and Zhang (2000) use a modiﬁed restrictive-
ness index in which worksite laws and laws that have been into eﬀect longer are more
heavily weighted.
3 Impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws on Smoking Partici-
pation and Consumption
3.1 Studies based on Macro (aggregated) data
Early work on the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws on Tobacco consumption is mainly
based on aggregate annual time series at the state level (on per-capita measures of smok-
ing: e.g. total sales divided by the level of population) and usually considered state level
anti-smoking regulations. Such studies have usually found that smoking restrictions are
eﬀective in reducing the demand for cigarettes: Chaloupka and Saﬀer (1992); Keeler,
Hu, Barnett and Manning (1993); Wasserman, Manning, Newhouse and Winkler (1991);
Lanoie and Leclair (1998); Yurekli and Zhang (2000) and, more recently, Gallet (2007).
A summary of these studies is shown in table 1.
While aggregate data have the advantage of being easily available in most countries,
they do not allow to take into account the limited nature of the dependent variables and,
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therefore, to analyze individual behaviors such as smoking consumption and the eﬀect of
smoking bans on the probability of quitting smoking (participation). Estimation of ag-
gregate demand equations is subject to problems of simultaneous-equations bias, because
the price may be jointly determined by demand and supply. Thus instrumental variable
approaches are typically used to account for the likely endogeneity of cigarette prices4.
Another potential problem in using aggregate data is that the Clean Indoor Air Laws may
be endogenous: the presence of Clean Indoor Air Laws is reasonably expected to be more
closely related to average statewide cigarette consumption than to smoking by a given
individual in the state. Thus, the laws may be endogenous at the aggregate level creating
an upward bias in the coeﬃcient measuring the impact of the law on cigarette smoking.
Finally, most time-series cross-sectional studies suﬀer from serial correlation of the error
terms and heteroskedasticity, which should be accounted for by using an appropriate cor-
rection.
Chaloupka and Saﬀer (1992) use a time series of cross sections of the 50 states of
the United States and Washington, D.C., from 1975 through 1985, to estimate models
of cigarette demand. This is the ﬁrst econometric study trying to determine the eﬀect of
these restrictions on cigarette smoking. Two diﬀerent types of laws are examined with
respect to the increasing degree of restrictiveness: a public place Clean Indoor Air Law
and a private place Clean Indoor Air Law restricting smoking at work-sites as well as in
public places. To determine the impact of such laws on cigarette demand, single equation
models and simultaneous equations models are estimated to address the hypothesis that
these laws are exogenous and endogenous. The empirical model is derived from a theo-
retical one considering an individual maximizing utility, subject to an appropriate budget
constraint. Constrained optimization of this utility function yields a demand for cigarettes
as a function of the price of cigarette, the price of other goods, income and taste. The em-
pirical demand equation for cigarettes includes among the explanatory variables: Clean
Air Laws, the relative price of cigarettes, income and a variety of control variables such
as: short distance exports and imports capturing casual smuggling, long distance smug-
gling, per-capita tobacco production as a determinant of the pressure to pass Clean Air
Laws, a proxy for religious fundamentalism, the percentage of voters and two variables
measuring stress: the state unemployment and divorce rate.
Previous literature had emphasized that states where smoking is less prevalent are
more likely to pass Clean Air Laws. The result would be that OLS estimation of the
cigarette demand equation may be biased by the potential endogeneity of the Clean Air
Law. Ignoring the problem of endogeneity of the smoking restrictions results in over-
stating the impact on cigarette sales of both public and private place Clean Indoor Air
Laws. A Hausman-Wu test can be used to test this endogeneity assumption. Following
this procedure Chaloupka and Saﬀer (1992) show that the laws could not be treated as
exogenous and that cigarette sales have a signiﬁcant causal eﬀect on the passage of a
4This problem does not apply to countries in which the price of cigarettes is a monopoly price.
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private place Clean Indoor Air Law, implying that the passage of such a law is, in part,
the result of anti-smoking sentiment. Using a simultaneous equations approach that takes
into account endogeneity, it is shown that public place Clean Indoor Laws are found to
reduce signiﬁcantly cigarette demand whereas states that enacted the private place law
did not further reduce demand (the coeﬃcient associated to the private place law is not
statistically signiﬁcant). The coeﬃcients associated to the impact of public place and pri-
vate place laws in the simultaneous equations model are, respectively, -0.028 (-7.38) and
0.003 (0.96). This result does not imply that the level of smoking would not be reduced
if a private place Clean Indoor Law were passed nationally. Instead, it suggest that only
states with low levels of smoking due to strong anti-smoking sentiment have been able to
pass a private work place Clean Indoor Air Law, while states where smoking is prevalent
exhibit more pressure not to pass a restrictive law (Chaloupka and Saﬀer, 1992, p. 83).
Keeler et al.(1993) analyze the eﬀect of anti-smoking regulations on consumption
of cigarettes in California over the period 1980 through 1990 using aggregate sales of
cigarettes at the state level as measure of cigarettes consumption. They specify a single
equation model consistent with the theory of Rational Addiction (Becker and Murphy,
1988) and estimate it using full information maximum likelihood. The authors account for
seasonal variation in cigarettes wholesales and the likely endogeneity of cigarette prices
in the model. Regarding the eﬀects of anti-smoking ordinances, they are quite signiﬁcant
and in the expected direction (-0.0019). However when a time trend is included in the
model, capturing long run changes in smoking tastes, the eﬀect of anti-smoking regulation
is not signiﬁcant. The authors claim this result might be due to the time trend correlation
with the regulatory variable, i.e. to the fact that the trend captures, in fact, long run trends
inherent in regulation, price and addiction variations.
A similar analysis is carried out by Sung et al.(1994) on pooled cross sections from
1967 to 1990 on 11 western states of the American federation. A system of two recur-
sive equations for cigarettes demand, consistent with rational addiction, and for oligopoly
price is estimated using Generalised Least Squares to control for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity in the error terms and including State and year dummy variables in
the price equation to control for omitted variables bias. The variable accounting for anti-
smoking regulation is signiﬁcant and in the expected direction (-0.049).
The recent work of Gallet (2007) uses a new rating system of Clean Indoor Air Laws
accounting for the severity of state smoking restrictions as well as for the strength of
enforcement and penalties for violation. The paper investigates the impact of Clean In-
door Air Laws on the demand for cigarettes using state-level annual time series for 48
contiguous American states over the 1993-1998 period and estimating a single equation
static model using a ﬁxed eﬀects two-stage least squares procedure (FE2SLS) to control
for endogeneity of the cigarette price. The author introduces an aggregate measure of
the overall smoking restriction for each state i in each year t and he also adds two addi-
tional variables accounting for two particular components of the regulation: the severity
9
of the restriction in each state and the strength of the state enforcement of the laws in
each state5. The results are consistent with other studies and ﬁnd that greater restrictions
reduce cigarette demand: the coeﬃcient of the smoking restrictions is negative and in
the range −0.291 and −0.336. Enforcement and penalties appear to have little impact on
cigarette demand lending credence to the idea that the social stigma associated to smok-
ing makes Clean Indoor Air Laws self-enforcing.
Lanoie and Leclair (1998) investigate the relative ability of taxes and regulation in
inducing reductions in cigarette consumption using data on ten Canadian provinces for
the period 1980-1995 and estimating a single equation model of partial adjustment in
cigarette consumption, implying habit formation. When considering the proportion of
smokers in the population as the dependent variable, they ﬁnd that smoking bans in
Canada signiﬁcantly reduce smoking participation (-0.038). However, when per-capita
consumption of cigarettes is the dependent variable, anti-smoking regulation is not sig-
niﬁcant. So it appears that smoking-bans have an eﬀect on the participation decision, i.e.
on the decision to smoke or not, but not on quantity of cigarettes smoked. An interpreta-
tion of this interesting result is that the negative impact of smoking bans on the smoking
participation decision carries the idea that smoking is socially unacceptable.
Yurekly and Zhang (2000) examine the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws and of
smuggling activities on per-capita cigarette consumption, measured as sales of packs of
cigarettes, and revenues using a static demand model and data for 50 American states
including the District of Columbia over the period 1970-1995. GLS is used in this study
to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms and cigarette ex-
cise taxes are used as instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of
cigarette prices. The Clean Indoor Air Laws measure has a negative impact on per-capita
consumption of cigarettes in all speciﬁcations used. The reduction in cigarette consump-
tion from anti-smoking regulation is signiﬁcant and increases over the period 1985-1995
as the laws have become more restrictive and comprehensive (-1.64).
3.2 Studies based on individual data
3.2.1 Studies based on population-wide surveys
There are many advantages in using individual data rather than aggregated per-capita
data. The ﬁrst one is that they allow the researcher to take into account the limited depen-
dent variable nature of smoking behavior and thus to separate the participation decision
from the decision of how many cigarettes to smoke. Given the limited nature of the
dependent variables, OLS techniques are inappropriate and diﬀerent methods based on
5The strength of state enforcement is measured by the presence of an enforcement authority that con-
ducts compliance inspections and the posting of signs forbidding smoking. Strength of penalties is mea-
sured by the presence of ﬁnes that rise with the severity of the infraction.
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discrete choice models are typically used with this type of data. The second advantage
is that micro data allow to control for individual heterogeneity aﬀecting smoking behav-
ior. Finally, including Clean Indoor Air Laws indices in cigarette demand equations may
present a problem of endogeneity when estimating such equations using aggregate data.
This should not be a problem when estimating cigarette demand equations using individ-
ual data. The presence of Clean Indoor Air Laws is expected to be more closely related
to average statewide cigarette consumption than to smoking by a given individual in the
state, because any individual’s decision to smoke will negligibly inﬂuence the willingness
of legislators to enact laws restricting smoking in public places (Wasserman et al., 1991).
Thus, the laws may be endogenous at the aggregate level, but are likely to be exogenous
at the individual level (Chaloupka, 1992; Chaloupka and Saﬀer, 1992).
The ﬁrst group of studies selected in table 2 uses large survey data to conduct their
analysis. The advantage of using large nationally representative surveys is that the large
sample size usually allows to explore the diﬀerential eﬀects that anti-smoking policies
have on demographic subgroups of interest. There are also important drawbacks arising
from using cross-sections from large surveys. The ﬁrst one is that there is strong evidence
that cigarette smoking is underreported in survey data. In most cases, no information
is available on the extent of underreporting or on how underreporting varies with con-
sumption. The usual way of coping with this problem is to consider a given degree of
underreporting for each individual in the sample.
A more serious problem is that cross sectional studies may make it diﬃcult to assess
whether there is a causal relationship between smoking bans and smoking, because indi-
viduals are observed only at one point in time. This may hide omitted variables and/or
self-selection bias. This type of problem may be addressed using panel data, when avail-
able. Longitudinal studies that analyze smoking prevalence before and after the imposi-
tion of bans mitigate some of these problems (Evans et al. (1999)).
Wasserman et al. (1991) estimate both a generalized linear model and a Double-
Hurdle model to examine the impact of excise taxes and of regulations restricting smok-
ing in public places on adult and teenage cigarette demand. They use individual data
taken from the National Health Interview Survey from 1970 to 1985. They estimate both
a Poisson-like speciﬁcation of the cigarette demand equation, which they call ”the gener-
alized linear model” and a Two-part model (Cragg, 1971). Data on regulations restricting
smoking in public places were collapsed into a discrete regulation index going from 1, for
the most restrictive regulation, to 0 in case of no regulations in place. This index is shown
to have a depressing eﬀect on cigarette consumption across all speciﬁcations used of the
generalized linear model. The percentage reduction in packs smoked due to an increase
in the regulation index is 5.9%. When the two-part model is used to estimate adult partic-
ipation and consumption, the regulation index has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
number of cigarettes smoked, but not on the decision to be a current smoker. An opposite
eﬀect is found for teenage smoking: the regulation index exerts a statistically signiﬁcant
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impact on the probability of being a smoker, but not on the conditional equation. Al-
though regulations restricting smoking in public places may not aﬀect adults’ decisions
to continue to smoke, but merely the number of cigarettes smoked, regulations appear
to have an important inﬂuence on teenagers’ decisions to start smoking. Tauras (2006)
updates the work of Wassermanet al.(1991), using the same types of models and a large
sample of 545,603 observations from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate
the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws on smoking prevalence and intensity (measured as
average monthly number of cigarettes smoked) in the United States. In line with what was
previously found by Wasserman et al.(1991) Clean Indoor Air Laws do not have a signif-
icant impact on smoking prevalence, but they are strong predictors of smoking intensity.
Simulations predicting average smoking, conditional on the coverage and strength of the
regulation, show that an increase in the number and strength of smoking bans decreases
the number of cigarettes smoked between 5.18% and 7.96%.
Chaloupka (1992) estimates cigarette demand equations for the United States, derived
from the Becker and Murphy model of rational addiction, which include alternative mea-
sures of state level Clean Indoor Air Laws. Survey data taken from the Second National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES2), conducted from 1976 to 1980
and reporting the average level of individual daily consumption are used, augmented with
county level cigarette prices and excise taxes and state level measures of restrictions on
smoking. Four levels of restrictiveness on smoking are identiﬁed and a set of dichoto-
mous indicators for laws at each of these four levels are included to estimate the antic-
ipated non-linear impact of increased restrictiveness on cigarette smoking. The results
suggest that increasing the restrictiveness of these laws, beyond some basic level, does
not appear to have a greater impact on cigarette consumption: the value of the coeﬃcient
associated to increasing restrictiveness of the regulation, for the full sample (table 2) goes
from −0.265, for the basic level of regulation, to −0.159 for the strictest level. This last
coeﬃcient, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant. The author suggests that this counter
intuitive result implies that, beyond some point, the degree of restrictiveness of the law
is not what is aﬀecting cigarette demand, but there may be unobserved factors, such as
publicity on the negative health consequences of cigarette smoking, which are driving
the results. Demand equations estimated separately for men and women imply that the
impact of the Clean Indoor Air laws is found primarily among men. Cigarette smoking
among women is not aﬀected by either the presence or the restrictiveness of the law.
Chaloupka and Wechsler (1997) use a nationally representative sample of 16,570 stu-
dents at 140 US four-year colleges and universities taken from the individual-level survey
data Harvard College Alcohol Study. Based on the location of the college/university, sev-
eral additional variables were added to capture state and local restrictions on cigarette
smoking. The restrictions on smoking are captured by a set of ﬁve dichotomous indi-
cators reﬂecting state and/or local limits on smoking in workplaces, restaurants, retail
stores, schools and any other public place. Given the potential multi-collinearity be-
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tween the indicators6, a restrictiveness index is also used which takes a minimum value
of zero for sites that do not restrict smoking and a maximum value of four for sites with
very comprehensive restrictions against smoking in a number of public places, including
restaurants, as well as in private worksites. The authors use two alternative approaches.
Since their dependent variable is the ordered level of cigarette consumption constructed
from categorical data in the survey, ordered probit models are employed to estimate smok-
ing participation decisions. Then, a two part model of cigarette demand (Cragg, 1971)
is estimated. Here, Probit regressions are used to estimate smoking participation in the
ﬁrst step and least squares methods are used to estimate average daily cigarette consump-
tion by smokers, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the continuous
average daily consumption measure. Restricting smoking in public places and private
workplaces has a mixed impact on cigarette smoking. The restrictiveness indicator is not
signiﬁcant in any of the equations estimated. When disaggregating the index into indica-
tors for diﬀerent types of restrictions, however, the indicator for restrictions on smoking
in restaurants is negative and signiﬁcant in most participation equations. The same is true
for restrictions on smoking in schools. The indicator for other restrictions on smoking in
public places is insigniﬁcant in the smoking participation equations, but is negative and
signiﬁcant in the quantity of cigarettes smoked.
Evans et al.(1999) and Farrelly et al.(1999) pool the data from the 1991 and 1993
National Health Interview Survey to obtain a sample of 18,090 workers to be used to
examine the impact of workplace smoking restrictions on smoking behavior. They ﬁrst
estimate single equation models, where workplace smoking bans are assumed to be ex-
ogenous and then address the issue that these single equation estimates may be subject
to an omitted variable bias. To control for problems of omitted variables bias they adopt
three diﬀerent approaches. First, they include a number of variables that may signal the
underlying healthiness of the individual or ﬁrm and show that the estimated impact does
not change. Second, they show that the impact of workplace smoking bans is greatest
for workers with the longest work weeks. Third, they use two-stage least squares and
instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of the smoking ban, i.e.
a smoking ban is more likely to be introduced in ﬁrms with a larger proportion of non
smokers. Once omitted variable bias is controlled for, they ﬁnd that a complete smoking
ban in all work areas has a slightly larger impact on the prevalence of smoking than in
their previous set of estimates, in which bans are treated as exogenous. The result suggest
that, in this case, the omitted variable bias does not dramatically alter the conclusion from
the single equation estimation and that workplace smoking bans are an eﬀective way to
reduce smoking among adults.
Carpenter (2007) provides quasi-experimental evidence of the impact of a number of
6In presence of multi-collinearity the parameter estimates are unbiased, but their statistical signiﬁcance,
i.e. the precision with which they are estimated, is altered.
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very strong local smoking bans in Ontario, Canada, over the period 1997-2004. The dif-
ferential timing of adoption and the possibility to observe smoking behavior before and
after the implementation of strong local smoking bans justiﬁes the ”quasi-experimental”
nature of the work which makes the author more conﬁdent of capturing the causal rela-
tionship between regulations and smoking behavior. He uses a sample of 5,917 observa-
tions from repeated cross-sections over the period 1997-2004 supplied by CAMHMonitor
(Ontario Adult Drug Monitor). These data provide information on individual outcomes
both before and after the implementation of over 100 local smoking by-laws within On-
tario. The author claims his study provides more robust evidence on the impact of local
smoking bans in comparison with previous literature in that: 1) he only considers tough
100% smoke-free smoking bans; 2) considers only local laws; 3) explicitly accounts for
county-levels ﬁxed eﬀects; 4) explicitly accounts for regulations compliance; 5) provides
the ﬁrst estimates of the eﬀects of local bylaws and smoking bans distinguishing between
blue collar and white collar workers. While points 1), 2) and 5) actually strengthen the re-
sults, accounting for county ﬁxed eﬀects is a rather standard way of modeling unobserved
heterogeneity that is time invariant7. As regards as point 4) a previous study by Gallet
(2007) also controls for enforcement and penalties ﬁnding no signiﬁcant eﬀect, in line
with ﬁndings by Carpenter. Estimates for own smoking behavior conﬁrm that workplace
smoking bans reduce own smoking and local by-laws reduce the likelihood of reporting
daily second hand smoke exposure by about 30%. However these results are entirely
driven by blue collar workers. Non-blue collar workers do not exhibit a substantive re-
lationship between a local by-law and reported worksite smoking policies. On the other
hand, the probability of blue-collar workers being smokers falls between 4% and 11.3%
when the by-law is adopted.
A number of studies, mainly in health research, use logistic models to obtain estimates
of the impact of anti-smoking regulation on smoking prevalence, i.e. on the probability
to be a smoker or to quit smoking (Woodruﬀ et al.(1993), Kinne et al.(1993), Stephens
et al.(1997), Moskowitz et al. (2000)) and on both smoking prevalence and smoking in-
tensity (Glasgow et al. (1997)). Health Policy studies seem to be less concerned about
problems of omitted variable bias or more general problems of endogeneity that may
bias the results and that are very common in this area of social policy. Thus, very of-
ten, methods that could be used to control for endogenously determined right hand vari-
ables, such as instrumental variables methods, are ignored. This strand of literature seems
to pay less attention to the fact that complex theoretical and empirical modeling would
be required to draw causal inferences regarding the eﬀects of anti-smoking regulation
on human behavior. Woodruﬀ et al.(1993) examine the relationship between workplace
smoking policies and smoking prevalence among 11,704 workers in California between
1990 and 1991. Logistic regressions were used to determine the likelihood of being a
smoker under diﬀerent workplace policies on smoking, taking into account demographic
7Another Canadian study quoted above, Lenoie and Leclair (1998) also uses provincial ﬁxed eﬀects.
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variables. Workers in workplaces with only work area restrictions were 15% more likely
to be smokers than those who worked in a smoke-free workplace. Workers under lesser
restrictions or no restrictions were about 30% more likely to be smokers than those in
a smoke-free workplace. Glasgow et al. (1997) try to assess if more stringent smoking
policies were associated with increased probability to quit smoking. They use a survey
of 8,271 employed adult smokers respondents in 1988 and in 1993. Using Multiple Logit
models, and after having controlled for a number of variables, they showed that employ-
ees who worked in a smoke-free worksite were over 25% more likely to make a serious
attempt to quit smoking and over 25% more likely to achieve cessation than those who
worked in a worksite that permitted smoking. Among continuing smokers, employees
in smoke-free worksites consumed on average 2.8 cigarettes per day less than those who
worked in places with a non-restrictive smoking policy. Stephens et al.(1997) use data on
smoking status of 11,652 individuals, taken from the General Social Survey conducted
by Statistics Canada in 1991 to analyze the impact of no-smoking bylaws on smoking
prevalence in Canada. This national survey provides data on smoking prevalence for each
of the 10 Canadian provinces so that the impact of no-smoking bylaws by province can
be studied while controlling for relevant individual diﬀerences such as: age, sex, marital
status, education and their interaction. A logistic model was used to estimate the varia-
tion in the probability of being a smoker. According to the study’s results, the presence
of no-smoking bylaws decreases the probability of being a smoker by 21%. Moskowitz
et al.(2000) estimate the impact of local workplace smoking laws in California on preva-
lence of smoking. Workplace smoking ordinances data from 1990 were merged with
1990 California Tobacco Survey individual data from 4,680 adult indoor workers who
were current cigarette smokers or reported smoking in the six months before the survey.
The eﬀect of such ordinances were estimated using a multiple logit model controlling for
a number of socio-demographic variables. Results show that smokers living in commu-
nities with strong smoking ordinances were 38% more likely to quit smoking than those
who worked in communities with no ordinances.
3.2.2 Longitudinal data
The crucial advantage of using Panel data to study the impact of anti-smoking regulation
is that the same sample of individuals is followed before and after the introduction of the
ban, so that the causal relationship between the adoption of a smoking ban and the eﬀect
on smoking behavior can be better assessed. Longitudinal studies that analyze smoking
prevalence in establishments before and after the imposition of bans may mitigate some
of the methodological problems that arise when using cross-sections. For example, lon-
gitudinal studies mitigate problems of self-selection bias (e.g. non smokers ﬁnd work in
smoke-free workplaces): if the match of smokers to ﬁrms is not random, the estimated
impact of bans on smoking prevalence may be biased. Moreover, they are not subject to
problems of endogeneity (ﬁrms with a lower-than-average prevalence of smoking may be
more likely to ban smoking). With longitudinal data the results are driven by compari-
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son of within-work site changes over time in the prevalence of smoking rather than by
cross-sectional diﬀerences and therefore this type of problem is ruled out (Evans et al.
(1999). Finally this type of data allow to control for time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity across ﬁrms or establishments.
A further advantage of Panel or longitudinal data is that they provide more information
over individuals and allow to capture the dynamics in their behavior. This is important to
study both the eﬀect on consumption and the eﬀect on smoking rates of smoking bans.
A dynamic speciﬁcation may allow to model addiction, i.e. to study the eﬀect of past
consumption of cigarettes on their current consumption levels. In addition, longitudinal
data allow focusing on transitions in smoking status and, in particular, on the eﬀects of
smoking bans on these transitions.
Unfortunately there is scarce international research using nationally representative
longitudinal data to study the economic impact of smoking bans. Buddelmeyer and
Wilkins (2005) investigate the role of smoking ban regulations in public venues across
a number of Australian states on individual level smoking patterns. They examine the
determinants of starting and quitting smoking using a sample of Australians interviewed
annually over the period 2001 to 2003. This data source allows to model transitions in
individuals’ smoking status of all individuals in the Australian community. To investigate
the eﬀect of smoking bans, the authors exploit a natural experiment provided by the vari-
ation across the states and territories of Australia in the timing and nature of regulations
introduced over the period spanned by the data. The methodology used is borrowed from
Jenkins and Cappellari (2004). The transition from one smoking status to the other is
modeled using a trivariate probit structure in which the ﬁrst equation models the propen-
sity to smoke in the base year; the second equation models the propensity to remain in the
sample from one period to the next and the third equation models the latent propensity to
smoke in the following period. The results show that restricting smoking in public places
does increase quitting probabilities and reduces starting probabilities. The mean marginal
eﬀect of introducing tougher smoking legislation is a reduction in the smoking probability
of the reference group (a non drinking, non-socialising person aged 60 years or over) by
7%.
Bauer et al.(2005) used data from the Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Ces-
sation (COMMIT), a large, population-based prospective cohort of smokers funded by the
National Cancer Institute from 1988 to 1993, to examine the eﬀects of worksite smoking
policies on 20 US communities and 2 Canadian communities. COMMIT’s participants
were followed up in 2001 to examine how changes in worksite policies inﬂuenced smok-
ing behaviors. The empirical investigation focuses on 1967 participants who indicated
that they smoked and were employed in both the 1993 and 2001 survey waves. Smoking
status, cigarette smoked per day, serious quit attempts made between 1993 and 2001, and
use of smokeless tobacco were used as dependent variables, whereas the primary inde-
pendent variables of interest was reported changes in worksite smoking policies between
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1993 and 2001. Standard logistic and multiple regression models were used. The control
variables included in the analysis were gender, race/ethnicity, age in 2001, education in
2001, annual household income in 2001, type of occupation in 2001, amount smoked in
1993, desire to quit in 1988 and number of previous quit attempts in 1993. Results show
that the more restrictive is the smoking policy, the greater is the likelihood that individu-
als were successful in quitting smoking or in lowering their daily cigarette consumption
if they continued to smoke. People whose workplaces restricted smoking were 1.9 times
more likely to have quit smoking by 2001 than people whose workplaces did not restrict
smoking. Those who worked in smoke free environments but continued to smoke reported
reducing their average daily consumption by about 2.5 cigarettes per day.
3.3 European studies
To date, there are few European studies trying to investigate the impact of smoking bans
on smoking prevalence and intensity. All of them use cross-sectional data (except for
Fong et al.(2006)), which are exposed to the limitations listed before.
The relationship between prohibition of smoking at the workplace and smoking ces-
sation has been assessed in Germany using a national sample survey conducted in 1987
(Brenner et al. (1992)). A sample of 439 individuals was selected and logit regression
was carried out. Results show that prohibition of smoking at the workplace was associ-
ated with a very large reduction of smoking intensity among women (OR=0.22) and, to a
lesser degree, also among men (OR=0.80).
Fong et al.(2006) use a national cohort study of 1,679 adult smokers in Ireland and
in the UK to conduct a quasi-experimental study on the eﬀect of the Irish smoke-free
workplace law in introduced in 2004. Parallel cohort telephone surveys of nationally
representative samples of adult smokers in Ireland (n=769) and in the UK (n=416) were
conducted before the law and 8-9 months after the implementation of the law. Using
generalised linear models the authors ﬁnd that the Irish law led to a dramatic decline in
reported smoking in all venues, including workplaces (from 62% to 14%), restaurants
(from 85% to 3%), and bars/pubs (from 98% to 5%).
Helakorpi et al. (2007) examined changes in adult daily smoking in 1981-2005 in
Finland, in order to evaluate the impact of the 1995 Tobacco Control Act Amendment
(TCAA) on the proportion of daily smokers. The study is based on a sample of 73,471
data from a postal survey on adults in 1981-2005. Logistic models were used to test the
eﬀect of the 1995 smoking ban on prevalence of smoking. The OR for daily smoking
after 1995 was 0.83 for employed men and 0.78 for employed women compared with OR
equal to 1.00 in 1994. A study based on the same investigation period, 1994-1996, has
been carried out by Heloma et al. (2001) on a repeated cross-sectional design involving
967 employees, in the ﬁrst wave of the survey (1994-1995), and 1035 in the second wave
17
(1995-1996) in the area of Helsinki to assess the impact of the 1995 TCAA on smoking
prevalence. A comparison of the distributions of smoking prevalence in the two waves
has shown that the average number of cigarettes smoked, among men and women, has
decreased by 16% from 1994 to 1996.
Gallus et al. (2006) considered a survey of 3,114 adults carried out in Italy in 2004
and 2005 to investigate the impact of the Clean Indoor Air Law introduced in Italy in
2005. A comparison of the distributions of smoking prevalence and smoking intensity in
2004 and in 2005 revealed a decrease in smoking prevalence by 2.3% and a decrease in
the mean number of cigarettes smoked per day by 5.5%.
3.4 Summary of results
A summary of the studies discussed in this section is presented in table 1 and 2. There
is wide evidence that Clean Indoor Air Laws reduce smoking intensity, whereas evidence
is mixed as regards as smoking prevalence. Among smoking bans, worksite smoking
policies are more eﬀective at reducing smoking among workers. A number of method-
ological points are worth noting. First, in analyzing the impact of smoking bans, local
laws are assumed to have more enforcement power than state-wide laws. In order to
test this issue, measures of compliance and enforcement are needed. Only a few studies
have included such measures (Gallet (2007) and Carpenter (2007)) showing that, in fact,
compliance and enforcement measures matter little. This suggests that Clean Indoor Air
Laws can be thought of as self-enforcing. Second, worksite smoking bans are likely to
have a larger impact than public places smoking bans. However, worksite studies may be
aﬀected by selection bias due to attrition. The level of restrictiveness of the law seems to
be important in driving the impact of regulation. Third, individual (micro) data provide
many advantages over aggregated data: i) they usually allow to include a full set of de-
mographic controls that may aﬀect individual behavior, thus reducing the risk of omitted
variable bias; ii) problems of endogeneity of the smoking regulation are ruled out when
using individual data; iii) the participation decision may be separated from the consump-
tion decision. The limited nature of the dependent variable requires the use of estimation
methods diﬀerent from ordinary least squares. Fourth, among individual data sets, large
Panel data or repeated cross-sections are best suited to assess the impact of anti smoking
regulation on smoking behavior. Since longitudinal data analyze smoking prevalence be-
fore and after the imposition of the bans, problems of omitted variable bias (diﬀerences
in the prevalence of smoking across workplaces may be due to factors other than smok-
ing policies; ﬁrms may have adopted programs that promote health among workers; ﬁrms
with a high fraction of non-smokers may have promoted the adoption of workplace smok-
ing bans;) and of self-selection bias (nonsmokers ﬁnd work in smoke-free workplaces) are
mitigated, thus allowing to better assess the causal relationship between regulation and
smoking behavior.
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4 The Impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws on the Hospital-
ity Industry
A more recent strand of literature investigates the eﬀects of anti-smoking regulation on
the hospitality industry. Eriksen and Chaloupka (2007) emphasize that, as the evidence
on the negative health consequences of exposure to tobacco smoke increased, arguments
against smoke-free air policies concentrated on their economic impact on the hospital-
ity industry. Scollo et al. (2003) mention that in California in 1987 a 100% smoke-free
restaurant ordinance in Beverly Hills was rolled back, partly in response to claims that
the ordinance was responsible for reducing restaurant revenues.
Studies investigating this indirect eﬀect of anti-smoking regulation can be divided
into those using objective data on economic outcomes such as: sales, employment, rev-
enues, taxes on revenues, number of licensed establishments; and studies using survey
data and subjective measures about the owners’ perceptions of the impact of smoke-free
air policies on their businesses, self-reported measures of business revenues, individual
dining and drinking out patterns and/or expected changes in these behaviors in response
to a smoke-free air policy and individual preferences for smoke free dining/drinking. The
conclusions of the vast majority of these papers, both based on objective and on sub-
jective measures of outcomes, are consistent in ﬁnding no negative economic impact of
clean indoor air policies on the hospitality sector. Pakko (2006a), however, calls for
caution in evaluating the ﬁndings of such studies, because a number of methodological
problems may aﬀect the results. Scollo and Lal (2002 and 2008) in their comprehensive
review of studies assessing the impact of smoke free regulation on the hospitality industry,
estimated that the probability of ﬁnding a negative economic impact in works based on
subjective data is four times higher than in studies based on objective measures. This may
be due to a ”negative placebo eﬀect” (Glantz, 2007). This term refers to a well known
pitfall in clinical trials according to which patients report feeling better after receiving a
treatment even though the treatment had no real beneﬁt. In the context of anti-smoking
regulation, the negative placebo eﬀect refers to the impact of claims by the hospitality
and the Tobacco industry about the negative economic eﬀect of anti-smoking regulation
on the perception of people in the hospitality industry. This negative placebo eﬀect is
also most likely to occur soon after the law is introduced when contrasting forces work to
create the impression that the law is creating economic turmoil.
Many studies assessing the economic impact of anti-smoking regulation on the hos-
pitality industry are natural experiments in which data on outcomes are collected before
and after the implementation of the policy, along with comparable data from other juris-
dictions where there was no policy change, as a control group. From a methodological
standpoint it is crucial to take into account the volatility of the hospitality industry’s per-
formance, by including appropriate controls for factors, diﬀerent from anti-smoking reg-
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ulation, that may have an impact on the business activity. Neglecting such factors causes
omitted variable bias in the ﬁndings which will therefore be misleading (Pakko, 2006a).
Among these, seasonality plays an important role in the hospitality industry performance
and should appropriately be accounted for. In addition, all data points after the law was
implemented and several years before should be included in the analysis and regression
methods controlling for secular trends and random ﬂuctuations in the data should be em-
ployed.
4.1 Studies based on Natural Experiments
Natural experiments have gained considerable popularity in recent years due to, among
other things, the simplicity of the estimation method. This method is known as the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator. The statistical apparatus underlying this approach has
been extensively used in labor economics and a clear summary of the pros and cons of
this approach is contained in Blundell and Macurdy (1999). The basic idea is to compare
at least two groups, one of which experienced a speciﬁc policy change, and another with
similar characteristics whose behavior was unaﬀected by this policy change. The second
group is assumed to mimic a control environment. The control environment is usually
created by including exogenous variables in the analysis designed to adjust for relevant
diﬀerences among sample observations. The impact of the policy intervention is mea-
sured as the net diﬀerence between the change in economic outcomes for the treatment
and the control environment. Blundell and Macurdy (1999) emphasize that, contrary
to the common perception, the natural experiment approach is entirely equivalent to the
ﬁxed eﬀects model developed in the early 70ies in the panel data literature. They show
that the ﬁxed eﬀects and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators do not merely share the
same asymptotic distribution, but they are computationally identical. Therefore the struc-
tural restrictions required for consistent estimation of a ﬁxed eﬀects model, with both
time and individual eﬀects, also hold for natural experiments. Blundell and Macurdy
(1999) list two sets of structural restrictions that must be met in order to obtain consistent
estimation of these models: i) time eﬀects must be common in both the experimental and
the control group, i.e. any diﬀerence in trend or cyclical eﬀects among experimentals and
controls must be ruled out8; ii) the composition of both the experimental and the control
group must remain stable before and after the policy change, i.e. each of the two groups
must be made up of the same individuals in both periods under investigation. If this is not
the case, the coeﬃcient associated to the policy change of interest can be biased, because
diﬀerencing does not phase out all the unobserved individual eﬀects that are correlated
with the explanatory variables. Among the natural experiment studies surveyed the study
of Adams and Cotti (2007), Adda et al.(2006) and Carpenter (2007) meet both sets of
structural restrictions.
8Blundell andMacurdy (1999) p. 1611, stress that trends and cycles diﬀer for married and single people,
by gender and for high and low skilled workers and therefore an appropriate speciﬁcation must be chosen
to meet the ﬁrst set of structural assumptions.
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The ﬁrst of these studies, by Glantz and Smith (1994), focused on the eﬀects of local
smoke-free restaurant laws adopted between 1985 and 1992 in 15 California and Col-
orado communities. Multiple regression methods were used to assess the impact of those
ordinances on taxable restaurant sales revenues as a share of total revenues before and
after the implementation of smoke-free laws in those communities and in 15 comparable
communities that did not implement such ordinances. The authors ﬁnd no evidence of
a negative economic impact on the restaurant business. In their follow up study (Glantz
and Smith, 1997), the authors updated their analysis and included the impact of local
smoke-free bar ordinances in 7 California sites that also had banned smoking in drink-
ing establishments, using a comparable measure of revenues from businesses licensed to
serve alcohol. Even in this case, the authors found no signiﬁcant economic impact of the
local ordinances on either restaurants or bars.
Hyland and Cummings (1999) use measures of employment in New York City’s
restaurants to assess the economic impact of the smoke-free restaurants ordinances in
New York city in April 1995 comparing trends in the city to those in neighboring coun-
tries and the rest of the state. They conclude that the policy measure did not result in the
job losses opponents had argued would occur. They found that between 1993 and 1997
there was an 18% rise in restaurant employment in New York City compared with a 5%
increase in the rest of the state. Similar evidence, using a similar approach, was found
in a number of studies referred to nearby counties and published in a special issue of the
Journal of Public Health Management and Practice in January 1999.
Hyland et al.(2009) investigate how Scotland smoke-free law has impacted on self-
reported secondhand smoke exposure in hospitality venues, workplaces and people’s
homes. They use a quasi-experimental approach using a telephone survey of nationally
representative samples of smokers and non-smokers interviewed before the Scottish law
(1335 smokers of which 507 in Scotland and 828 in the rest of the UK and 601 non-
smokers of which 301 in Scotland and 300 in the rest of the UK) and one year after the
law in Scotland (705 smokers and 417 non-smokers) and the rest of the UK (1027 smok-
ers and 447 non-smokers). Second hand smoking exposure was dramatically reduced in
Scottish pubs, restaurants and workplaces following their nationwide smokefree regula-
tions and there is no evidence of an economic downturn in Scotland or displacement of
smoking from pubs to the home following the smokefree law.
Adda et al.(2006) collected a sample of 2724 observations, via telephone interviews,
on the sales and number of customers in public houses in Scotland (1590 obs., interven-
tion group) and in Northern England (1134., control group) before and after the intro-
duction of the Scottish smoking ban in March 2006. This is the ﬁrst European study
investigating the economic eﬀect of smoking bans on the hospitality business. The au-
thors use a quasi-experimental approach comparing what happened to pub level outcomes
21
in a treatment area (Scotland) with an other wise comparable control area (Northern Eng-
land) before and after the ban was introduced. Linear regression models were used in
which three dummies were included, among the explanatory variables, to capture the ef-
fect of the location of the pubs before the ban (whether they are located in Scotland or
not and observed before the ban was introduced); the eﬀect of the smoking ban (whether
the observation refers to a time period before or after the ban) and the eﬀect of the ban
on Scottish pubs (whether a pub is located in Scotland and observed after the ban was in-
troduced). The ﬁrst of these indicators captures permanent diﬀerences between Scottish
and English pubs. The second dummy captures aggregate changes in sales and number
of customers between the two waves that are common to Scotland and England. Finally,
the coeﬃcient on the indicator variable for Scottish pubs after the ban captures the causal
impact of the smoking ban. Controls were added to account for location (rural versus ur-
ban) and size (number of employees at baseline) of the pubs. Finally, they used only the
pubs which were surveyed twice and estimated a ﬁxed eﬀects model capturing any time
invariant unobserved pub characteristics which may confound the relationship between
the outcomes of interest and the smoking ban. The eﬀect of the smoking ban produces a
fall in pubs’ sales by about 9.7%. This gap arises as the result of a 5.5% growth in sales
in Northern England compared with a 4.2% fall in Scotland.
Previous studies, focussed on bans in the United States, had mostly found no negative
eﬀect of such measures, whereas this study ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and large negative eﬀect.
Glantz (2007) observes that these ﬁndings might be biased by a negative placebo eﬀect
which may occur when using subjective measures of outcomes, such as those obtained
when using telephone survey. He also stresses that, once enough time has passed to get
hard data, the initial reports of adverse economic eﬀects prove to have been wrong. One
way to control for the presence of a placebo eﬀect would be to have data following indi-
viduals’ behavior for a long time after the introduction of the ban. Adda and his coauthors,
however, stress that they have tried to minimize the placebo eﬀect by collecting the data
before and after the survey and by relegating any direct question involving the owners’
view about the ban towards the end of the survey.
Adams and Cotti (2007) perform the ﬁrst diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence study for the US of
the impact of anti-smoking regulation on the employment level of bars and restaurants.
Their primary ﬁnding is that smoking bans reduce employment in bars. On the other
hand they have a neutral or mildly positive eﬀect on employment in restaurants. As the
prevalence of smokers in a region increases, negative eﬀects of legislation become more
pronounced, especially for bars. Positive restaurant employment eﬀects appear to occur
where the option of outside seating for potential smokers is most attractive, i.e. in areas
with warmer climates all year round. In this study, only 100% smoking bans are con-
sidered, and a sample of 16,248 bars and 39,565 restaurants is considered. The data are
supplied by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) Quarterly Census on Employment and
Wages (QCEW) on county employment levels, across the US, from 2001 to 2004, across
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drinking establishments and full-service restaurants. The availability of large highly dis-
aggregated panel data, allows the authors to identify a treatment and control group and to
estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model. Moreover, they identify eﬀects from the passage of laws
that came after the ﬁrst wave of smoking bans. This is an advantage, because it avoids
problems of sample-selection bias. They also observe whether eﬀects deviate by climate.
Although bar eﬀects do not diﬀer by the climate of a region, the authors ﬁnd a positive
employment eﬀect on restaurants where the option of outdoor seating for potential smok-
ers is most attractive (areas with warmer climates all year round and areas with cooler
climates during the warmest months of the year). Restaurants are negatively aﬀected dur-
ing harsher periods in colder areas, suggesting that the presence of outdoor seating allows
an option for smokers while providing non-smokers with an inside option.
4.2 Other types of Studies
Alamar and Glantz (2004), using a database that records the purchase price of restau-
rants that are sold, estimate the value added to a restaurant by a smoke free policy using
weighted least squares (to control for heteroskedasticity) regression of the purchase price
of restaurants as a function of the presence of a smoke-free law and a number of con-
trol variables. Data on the sale of restaurants and bars in the US were gathered from the
BizComps database and included a sample of 726 transactions over the period 1991 to
2002. For each of the transactions observed the authors determined which business was
covered by a local 100% smoke-free restaurant ordinance. After controlling for relevant
economic variables, the authors observed a median increase of 16% in the sale price of a
restaurant which, they claim, is directly attributable to the existence of a smoke-free law.
In a similar study, published in 2007, the same authors used an updated version of the
database to replicate the analysis on bars’ sales alone, using 197 observations from 1993
to 2005, and ﬁnding that the smoke-free law was not statistically signiﬁcant in explaining
the variation in the transactions’ price. They conclude that the existence of smoke-free
bar laws had no detectable eﬀect on the proﬁtability of bars. Despite the authors’ claim
of evidence of causal link between restaurants and bars sales and smoke-free regulation,
richer data could be used and a larger set of control variables included to measure a vari-
ety of potential and actual causal factors.
Binkin et al.(2007) try to document the eﬀects of the 2005 smoking ban in all enclosed
public places in Italy9. Four surveys were conducted between December 2004 and Febru-
ary 2006. Diﬀerent samples were drawn in each of the surveys: 471 bars and restaurants
in six local health units (LHU) were included in the pre-implementation survey; 1961
locales in 35 LHU were included in the ﬁrst post-implementation survey; 1536 locals in
33 LHU were included in the second post-implementation survey and 1616 locales in 34
9Article 4 of the Law n.3 of 16 January 2003, introducing a smoking ban in public places in Italy, makes
explicit allowance for designated smoking rooms in those public places which are subject to the Law.
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LHU were included in the last post-implementation survey. Descriptive statistics were
used to compare diﬀerences between the pre and post implementation smoking status, in-
tensity and economic outcomes of the locales. Before the ban, 24% of owners predicted
major ﬁnancial losses. One year later only 7% reported major ﬁnancial losses. Most
owners/managers (88%) reported positive attitudes about the law and 79% reported such
attitudes among clients.
Cowling and Bond (2005) present evidence that smoke-free restaurant and bar laws,
introduced in California in 1995 and in 1998 respectively, have actually increased rev-
enues from both restaurants and bars. Their central ﬁnding is that, relative to trend, restau-
rant revenues increased following the introduction of the smoke-free restaurant law in
1995; likewise, bar revenues increased, relative to trend, after the smoke-free bar law was
introduced in 1998. In both cases, the ﬁndings suggest that any substitution by smokers
away from the locales aﬀected was more than oﬀset by the substitution by non-smokers
towards the sale locales. Data used to develop the study were supplied by the California
Board of equalization on quarterly taxable sales, for eating and drinking establishments,
in California from 1990 to 2002. Both state level and county level (on 36 out of the 58
counties existing in California) were collected in order to perform both a state-level anal-
ysis and a county-level analysis. Linear regression methods were used.
Lund and Lund (2006) analyze descriptive statistics supplied by Statistics Norway
to evaluate the impact of the absolute ban on smoking in all hospitality venues in 2004.
According to such data, value added taxes (VAT) collected from the hospitality industry
increased by 5% in the ﬁrst sixteen months after the ban compared with the same period
prior to the introduction, after controlling for seasonality in the data.
Pakko (2006a) uses a sample of 26 observations, spanning from the ﬁrst quarter of
1998 through the second quarter of 2004, supplied by the Department of Health and Se-
nior Services (DHSS), on taxable restaurants’ sales receipts in Maryville, Missouri, to
assess the impact on restaurants’ sales of an ordinance, adopted in June 2003, that pro-
hibited smoking in restaurants. He employs standard linear regression techniques (OLS)
to test the hypothesis that the smoking ban had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on Maryville bar and
restaurants sales. After controlling for a linear time trend, seasonality, economic factors
and new restaurant openings, he ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the smoking ban
on restaurants’ sales. The increase in sales, registered in the data near the end of the inves-
tigation period, is shown to be explained more by the opening of a new restaurant in town
than by the implementation of the smoking ban so that any claims about the smoking ban
having beneﬁcial eﬀects on bars and restaurants sales in Maryville cannot reasonably be
advanced.
An instructive example of how methodological diﬀerences may drastically change the
results comes from the debate caused by the study of Mandel, Alamar and Glantz (2005)
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between the authors of this study and M.R. Pakko (2006b), an economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Mandel, Alamar and Glantz (2005) show that the imple-
mentation of a smoking prohibition in Delaware had no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
revenues in the gaming industry. Pakko (2006b) uses the same dataset and a more general
approach to control for heteroscedasticity and seasonality in the data and ﬁnds that total
gaming revenues declined signiﬁcantly after the implementation of the Delaware smoke-
free law. Pakko was skeptical in accepting the results of Mandel et al.(2005), because
after correcting for heteroscedasticity in the residuals of their estimates, the coeﬃcient
on the dummy variable representing the implementation of the smoke-free law changed
signiﬁcantly in the Mandel et al.(2005) study. This led Pakko to replicate the results, be-
cause in presence of heteroscedasticity, coeﬃcient estimates are ineﬃcient but unbiased
and, therefore, they should not change signiﬁcantly. First of all, Pakko drops observations
from 1996 from the sample, eliminating the main source of heteroscedasticity. Then, he
uses the Newey andWest procedure to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
in the residuals. Finally, seasonal eﬀects are captured in two separate sets of estimates
using quarterly dummies and monthly dummy variables. Pakko obtains opposite results:
the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable representing the implementation of the law sug-
gests a revenue loss of about 13% in the gaming industry, compared to the year preceding
the smoking ban, and it is statistically signiﬁcant.
5 Methodological Issues
The reviews carried out in the previous sections have touched upon a number of method-
ological issues that are crucial for obtaining reliable empirical evidence on the impact of
Clean Indoor Air Laws. In this section we survey the main methodological issues that
arise in shaping empirical applications of the type examined in this paper. The purpose of
this section is trying to unfold the reasons of the wide heterogeneity in the results and, as
a consequence, to provide an assessment of the reliability of those results.
5.1 Causality
Two points seem worth mentioning at this stage. The ﬁrst one relates to the attention
paid, in the papers reviewed, to the causality nexus. In most tests of economic theory, and
certainly for evaluating public policy, the economist’s goal is to infer that one variable has
a causal eﬀect on another variable. Simply ﬁnding an association between two or more
variables might be interesting, but unless causality can be established, such association
is not compelling. The key question, in most empirical studies, is whether enough other
factors have been held ﬁxed to make a case for causality, in other words the notion of
ceteris paribus (which means ”other factors being equal”) plays a crucial role in causal
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analysis. Carefully applied econometric methods can simulate a ceteris paribus experi-
ment. However, in most serious applications, the number of factors that can aﬀect the
variable of interest is enormous, and the isolation of the eﬀect any particular variable may
have seems a hard task, especially in the area of public policy, since input parameters of
investigated relationships may reﬂect unobserved individual characteristics and choices
(Heckman et al. (2008)). Correlations between input parameters and observed outcomes
may simply represent individual sorting on latent characteristics, rather than structural
relations between input and output variables. Heckman et al. (2008) again stress that the
acceptance of causal relationships should be founded on estimation of structural relation-
ships based on sound theoretical frameworks. They also notice that the lack of a sound
estimation of structural equations seems to be a common weakness in public health liter-
ature.
Here comes the second point. A sound economic theory should be, in many cases, the
starting point for empirical analysis, because a a robust theoretical framework points out
at the causal relationship between variables. So, what economic theory has to say about
the economic eﬀect of anti-smoking regulations ? While the relationship between reduced
smoking and health beneﬁts is now widely accepted, the positive relationship between the
presence or strength of a smoking ban and a reduction in smoking is nowadays more con-
troversial than it was a few decades ago. The rational addiction theory of Becker and
Murphy (1988) establishes a negative relationship between factors that raise the cost of
smoking (such as anti-smoking regulation) and the level of smoking. This literature pro-
vides a strong basis in support of a causal relationship between smoking regulation and
level of smoking. However, more recent contributions in behavioral economics (Bern-
heim and Rangel, 2004 and 2005) point out that, if smoking is driven by compulsive
behavior, policy measures such as anti-smoking regulation would not decrease the level
of smoking, but they would only have the eﬀect of raising the cost of smoking. In this
case there would be no signiﬁcant eﬀect of smoking bans on smoking levels. So eco-
nomic theory is not clear cut on even the most basic relationship between the regulatory
variable and the level of smoking. The most contentiously debated point is, however, the
economic impact on the hospitality industry. Even this controversy is not resolved by ap-
pealing to economic theory, as emphasized by Adams and Cotti (2007). Those opposing
anti-smoking regulation claim that regulations would stiﬂe the hospitality industry thus
reducing the demand for labor in this sector. Policy advocates, on the other hand, claim
that smoking regulations do not hurt establishments and may even add to revenue as well
as lower costs. Adams and Cotti (2007) suggest that if there was a potential for increased
business from going smoke free, restaurants and bars would have done so without regu-
lation. The problem, however, is that they may not have accurate information about the
potential changes in revenue that could derive from providing a smoke-free establishment.
Second, without the guarantee that all the competitors would also go smoke-free, ﬁrms
fear losing the business in favor of other establishments that still allow smoking. Craven
and Marlow (2008) argue that smoking bans are not necessary since the Coase theorem
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predicts that individuals have incentives to solve the smoking disputes privately without
appealing to public policies such as smoking regulations. If this was true, not only it
would be incorrect to argue that smoking bans are necessary, but it would also be incor-
rect to argue that such regulation causes no harm on business in the hospitality industry.
Instead, the bans may have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent businesses: some experiencing
losses, other gains and others no eﬀect at all. This implies that estimating aggregate ef-
fects of bans on businesses may be of little help in settling the debate.
Thus the theory leaves us with no ﬁrm guidance as to what to expect following smok-
ing restrictions in the hospitality industry. These considerations lead us to the conclusion
that developing and accurately estimating a robust structural model is the only way to
disentangle the questions. Heckman et al. (2008, p. 41) point out that the establish-
ment of reliable empirical evidence on a causal relationship would include the following
elements: 1) valid measurements of both smoking outcomes (or turnover outcomes) and
alleged causal factors, as well as other probable causes; 2) a clear argument demonstrating
that other potential causes of variation in the dependent variable have been accounted for;
3) replicability to allow other researchers to follow and duplicate the analysis. In what
follows we consider how these issues have been accounted for in the papers reviewed so
far.
5.2 data problems
Rich data sources are the ﬁrst requirement for developing and accurately estimating a
structural model of the determinants of smoking. Estimating the impact of a social policy,
such as a smoking ban, signiﬁcantly increase the number of factors and the interactions of
factors that need to be accounted for in the analysis. Individuals should be observed for
long periods of time (before and after the introduction of the smoking ban) and detailed
local data should be available. The lack of rich and detailed data sources makes it diﬃcult
to control for factors that may aﬀect the outcome of interest (omitted variables bias) or it
may undermine the ability to adequately test hypothesis (limited degrees of freedom).
5.2.1 Selection bias
Data should be obtained by random sampling from the underlying population. This may
not be the case if the data are aﬀected by ”selectivity problems”. A ﬁrst type of selectiv-
ity problem is known as self-selection bias. This happens when the sample is based on
whether the dependent variable is above or below a given value. In analysis of the impact
of smoking bans on smoking levels or prevalence it may be that non smokers ﬁnd work in
smoke-free environments. Farrelly et al.(1999) suggest this may be generated through a
number of diﬀerent channels. First, nonsmokers (smokers) can be attracted to ﬁrms with
(without) workplace smoking bans. In this case the impact of the ban would be overstated
in single equations estimates. Second, ﬁrms with the highest fraction of nonsmokers are
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more likely to adopt the ban. Third, ﬁrms with a ”healthy” attitude may introduce other
”healthy” workplace policy measures, therefore smoking may be lower in those ﬁrms be-
cause of these other measures and not because of the smoking ban.
Large panel (longitudinal) data sets may mitigate some of these problems, but they
may be aﬀected by a fourth source of selection bias which is known as endogenous attri-
tion. Attrition occurs when individuals leave the panel before the end of the period of the
panel. If these occurrences are random, the only consequence is a loss of information and
eﬃciency. If, on the other hand, those who leave the sample are systematically diﬀerent
from those who remain, this causes a problem of selection which causes the panel to lose
its representativeness (non-randomness of the sample).10 If the ban changes the type of
workers that are attracted to a ﬁrm or encourages smokers to leave a ﬁrm in higher num-
bers than nonsmokers, those individual units which are dropped from the sample from
one period to the other are not a random sample, but are driven by the smoking ban. In
this case the sample of observations left to the analysis looses its representativeness.
There is another source of sample selection bias which may aﬀect studies of the impact
of smoking bans. Many studies are based on countries or localities that ﬁrst introduced
the ban and are therefore more likely to have a proportionately smaller smoking popula-
tion and/or fewer businesses that would be adversely aﬀected by a smoking ban. Adams
and Cotti (2007, p. 7) notice that Utah and California, the two states in the American
federation with the lowest prevalence of smokers, passed the ﬁrst smoking-bans. Pakko
(2006a) also notes that the early studies on smoking bans used data from early bans,
which potentially introduces sample selection bias.
5.2.2 Measurement error in the dependent variable
One problem that aﬀect survey data collected through a questionnaire is underreporting.
Wasserman et al. (1991) suggests that underreporting of individual smoking can arise
because of the social undesirability of smoking. Thus, in estimating tobacco demand, one
should adjust for underreporting. However, information on underreporting is often not
available and the dependent variable might be measured with error. If the measurement
error is statistically independent of each explanatory variable, the only consequence of
measurement error in the dependent variable is a larger error variance. So OLS would still
produce consistent and unbiased estimators of the variables of interest, but their standard
errors would not be eﬃcient leading to more imprecise estimates. The ”placebo eﬀect”
mentioned at the beginning of section 4 also causes measurement error in the dependent
variable. In this case, however, the measurement error is correlated with the explana-
tory variable representing the smoking ban and this causes a bias in the OLS coeﬃcient
measuring the impact of the smoking ban on the turnover of the hospitality industry.
10Dealing with non-random attrition may then require selection correction methods beyond the statistical
methods required to deal with longitudinal data.
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5.2.3 Measurement error in explanatory variables
A more serious problem than measurement error in the dependent variable is measure-
ment error in the explanatory variables. Measurement error in the explanatory variables
produces the classical errors-in-variables (CEV) assumption. The implication is an atten-
uation bias in OLS estimates: on average (or in large samples), the estimated OLS eﬀect
will be attenuated, e.g. if β1 is positive, βˆ1 will tend to underestimate β1. Again, measure-
ment errors in the explanatory variables are more likely to occur in survey data collected
through a questionnaire, either due to respondents’ errors or due to data collection errors.
5.3 Endogeneity
Endogeneity refers to the fact that an independent variable included in the model is po-
tentially a choice variable, correlated with unobservables included in the error term. This
implies that the regression coeﬃcient in an OLS regression is biased. Examples of endo-
geneity include simultaneous equations bias (see Chaloupka and Saﬀer, 1992), omitted
variables bias which will be analysed in the next sub-section, sample selection bias and
measurement error bias (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 92). Endogeneity is likely to oc-
cur when cross-sections are used and this is why in economists are very concerned with
this problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 92). There are many methods of overcom-
ing this, including instrumental variable regression and Heckman selection correction. In
studies using aggregated data to assess the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws the Clean In-
door Air Law is often endogenous: the presence of the law is likely to be related to the the
average statewide level of cigarette consumption. This creates an upward bias in the OLS
estimation of the coeﬃcient measuring the impact of the law. One way of handling this
problem is to estimate a simultaneous equations model using a two step procedure. In the
ﬁrst step, a probit procedure estimates an equation for the probability of a state passing a
Clean Air Law. In the second step, a cigarette consumption equation is estimated, using
weighted Least Squares, in which observations on the dichotomous variable representing
the smoking ban are replaced with the ﬁrst step estimates. This is the procedure used by
Chaloupka and Saﬀer in their 1992 study.
Studies based on micro-data can also present problems of potential endogeneity of the
smoking ban. In studies of the eﬀect of workplace smoking regulation on the propensity
to smoke of workers, based on individual data, the potential endogeneity problem may be
due to the non-random match of workers and ﬁrms (non-smokers being attracted to ﬁrms
with workplace smoking bans), for instance.
Heckman et al.(2008) observe that in disciplines other than economics, for instance in
Health Studies, biases associated with endogeneity do not aﬀect the estimation of struc-
tural models because the omitted variables are not aﬀected by individual choice. However,
in evaluating the eﬀect of a public policy, problems of endogeneity of right hand variables
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are likely to occur when observations on explanatory variables are the result of individual
choice.
5.3.1 Omitted Variables bias
In statistics, omitted-variable bias (OVB) is the bias that appears in estimates of pa-
rameters in a regression analysis when the assumed speciﬁcation is incorrect, because
it omits an independent variable that should be in the model. Two conditions must hold
for omitted-variable bias to exist in linear regression: (i) the omitted variable must be
a determinant of the dependent variable (i.e., its true regression coeﬃcient is not zero);
and (ii) the omitted variable must be correlated with one or more of the included inde-
pendent variables. While incorrect omission of variables leads to biased estimates of the
parameters that are included, incorrect inclusion only produces ineﬃcient estimates of the
parameters that are included. So it’s better to include the wrong variables rather than ex-
clude the right ones. In the analysis of the impact of anti-smoking regulation, one source
of omitted variable bias can be self-selection (Evans et al.(1999)). Suppose that ﬁrms
adopting workplace smoking bans place a greater emphasis on the health and safety of
their employees, so that policies than ban smoking inside the ﬁrm simply reﬂect other
programmes adopted by the ﬁrm (like onsite exercise facilities or smoking cessation pro-
grammes). In those ﬁrms, smoking may be lower because of these other programmes, not
because of the smoking ban. If these other programmes oﬀered by the ﬁrm are an omitted
variable in the model, the estimated parameter for the impact of the smoking ban will be
biased. More generally, controlling for omitted variable bias by including all the diﬀerent
factors that may have an inﬂuence on the outcome of interest and by running appropriate
speciﬁcation tests is crucial in proving a causal relationship between the presence of a
ban and the level of smoking intensity or prevalence. Therefore, for informative studies
on individual choice, rich data are almost always essential (Heckman et al. (2008). Evans
et al.(1999) adopt three diﬀerent approaches to eﬀectively control for omitted variable
bias. First they control for health-habit indicators and ﬁrms’ characteristics that may have
an impact on the propensity to smoke of workers. Second, they assume that if there is
a causal link between bans and smoking, then they would expect the impact of the bans
to be a function of the costs they impose on workers. More precisely, the cost of the
ban should be greater for workers with long work weeks, because it’s more diﬃcult for
them to adjust to the ban by shifting the timing of their smoking. Thus, the authors add
indicators for the usual hours worked per week to their smoking equations. Third, they
allow for the non-randomness of the sample, i.e. for the non-random match of workers
and ﬁrms. In this case the workplace ban is treated as a potentially endogenous variable
and Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) methods are used to estimate their models.
Another relevant omitted variable is public sentiment against smoking (Wasserman
et al. (1991) and Tauras (2006)). Wasserman et al. (1991) argue that public sentiment
against smoking produces higher taxes and more stringent regulations. Since public sen-
timent is diﬃcult to measure, it has been excluded from virtually all data sets that have
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been used to model cigarette demand. Consequently, all correlated but included variables
will suﬀer from an omitted variable bias, with the omission of a public sentiment vari-
able biasing both the price and regulation index away from zero. Thus omission of this
variable would be an indictment of all micro studies of cigarette demand. An exception
is Tauras (2006) who controls for the possibility that unobserved state-level sentiment
toward smoking is driving both antismoking policy and changes in smoking behavior by
including state ﬁxed-eﬀect which are intended to capture all the time-invariant factors that
are unobserved at the state level and that may aﬀect cigarette smoking.
More generally, studies of the impact of antismoking regulation on smoking behavior
should include appropriate control variables for demographic characteristics, ﬁrms char-
acteristics (in workplace studies), time ﬁxed eﬀects and country ﬁxed eﬀects, besides the
main explanatory variables such as price, income and the regulation indicator. In stud-
ies of the impact of the smoking regulation on the hospitality industry, seasonality, trend
eﬀects and the presence of competitors in the same area represent important speciﬁc con-
trol variables, besides controls for overall economic conditions (including measures of
the economic cycle) and besides time and ﬁrms’ ﬁxed eﬀects. Time trend and seasonal
eﬀects are likely to generate a signiﬁcant fraction of the variation in restaurants and bars’
sales, as shown in Pakko (2006a). The same work shows that a large fraction of the varia-
tion in restaurants’ sales is captured by a dummy variable for the presence of competitors
in the same area in which the ban has been introduced.
5.3.2 The importance of demographics
The most recent research on the economic impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws highlights
the importance of ”demographic controls” (for studies of the impact of regulation on
smoking) and of ”ﬁrms characteristics” (for studies of workplace bans or of the impact
on the hospitality industry). Carpenter (2007) for instance, ﬁnds signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the impact of local smoking ordinances on blue collar workers smoking behavior and on
other types of workers’s smoking behavior and on men and women’s. Other demographic
distinctions might be relevant, such as ethnicity, marital status, education. Analogously,
Evans et al.(1999) use a rich set of indicators of individual health habits, collected in the
National Health Interviews Survey (NHIS), to control for omitted variables bias. This
again stresses the point that rich data sets, including precise measures of any factor that
may aﬀect choices, are essential to produce rigorous studies on individual behavior. Ad-
equately controlling for factors that may drive diﬀerences in the estimated impact of anti-
smoking regulation may be of help in developing more eﬀective policy measures. Not
taking into account those factors may result in designed policy measures to have scarce
eﬀectiveness or excessive costs.
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6 Discussion
A number of stylized facts have emerged from the review. First, since the early nineties,
a multitude of studies using diﬀerent methodological approaches has emerged trying to
assess the economic impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws. They can be broadly divided into
Economics and Health Policy studies. Second, there is a time lag between the spread of
Clean Indoor Air Laws in the U.S. and in Europe and, correspondingly, there is a time lag
between studies of the impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws in the U.S. and in Europe. Third,
most studies ﬁnd that smoking restrictions, whether imposed by public laws or private
ﬁrms, reduce the quantity of cigarettes smoked (intensity of smoking) and the probability
of being a smoker (prevalence of smoking), although for prevalence rates evidence is less
clear (Levy and Friend, 2003). Evidence on the impact of smoking restrictions on the
hospitality industry is more controversial and there is no clear-cut consensus on the sign
of the eﬀect of smoking restrictions on the hospitality industry. Fourth, the quality of the
data used in the analysis of both eﬀects has become, over time, increasingly important,
as studies have revealed that demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, labor
status, marital status, religion) and the length of time during which individual behavior is
observed play a crucial role as control variables in isolating a causal eﬀect between the
smoking restriction and the dependent variable. We now discuss these issues in detail.
The earliest policies restricting smoking in public places in the united States have fol-
lowed the 1972 Surgeon General’s Report on the possible adverse eﬀects of second hand
smoke. A second Surgeon General’s Report titled ”the Health Consequences of Invol-
untary Smoking” and released in 1986 also concluded that exposure to tobacco smoke
caused diseases, including lung cancer. There has been a strong opposition to the in-
troduction of smoking bans right from the start ﬁrst questioning the scientiﬁc evidence
proving the adverse eﬀects on health of second hand smoke and, secondly, question-
ing the eﬃcacy of smoking bans in reducing second hand smoke. This has generated a
lively debate in the academic and scientiﬁc arena involving economists and health scien-
tists trying to disentangle the debated question of the eﬀects of anti-smoking regulations.
When evidence on the health eﬀects of smoking has become incontrovertible concerns
about the economic impact of these policies, particularly on the hospitality industry, have
been raised, especially by actors in the Tobacco and hospitality industry, claiming that
smoke-free air policies will result in declining restaurant, bar and other hospitality in-
dustry revenues. This historical and political evolution in the spread of Clean Indoor Air
Laws may explain a number of observed patterns: (i) the fact that studies examining the
impact of anti-smoking regulation on smoking behavior precede studies of the impact on
the hospitality industry; (ii) the fact that we can envisage two separate strand of literature
from the point of view of the disciplines: econometric literature on one side and public
health literature on the other. While health scientists have been interested in demonstrat-
ing that smoking bans are an eﬀective way of reducing smoking, economists have been
more concerned of making sure that a causal relationship exists between smoking bans
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and smoking intensity or prevalence. The causality nexus seems to be the major concern
in applied economics research in this ﬁeld, while for health scientists this is less crucial
because, as emphasized by Heckman et al. (2008, p. 38), they are less familiar with
the problems involved in evaluating the intervention eﬀects of a public policy. The latter
implies modeling human choices which requires more elaborate theoretical and empirical
modeling than it would be required to draw causal inferences regarding drug eﬃcacy in
a controlled experiment environment, for instance. (iii) Smoking regulation in the U.S.
has anticipated smoking regulation in Europe. At the time of the introduction of the ﬁrst
smoking bans in Europe the academic debate had already settled the question of the ad-
verse health eﬀects of smoking and therefore the political opposition to the introduction of
the smoking regulation has been weaker. This may explain the paucity of European stud-
ies trying to assess the impact of anti-smoking regulations on smoking behavior, whereas
the European literature assessing the eﬀect on the hospitality industry is relatively more
abundant.
As to the empirical ﬁndings, there is a widespread consensus that smoking-bans re-
duce smoking intensity and a less clear pattern emerges on the eﬀect on smoking preva-
lence. In both cases, however, there is a considerable variation in the amount of reduction
in smoking behaviors observed. The eﬀect of smoking bans on the hospitality industry
is, instead, more controversial. In this case, more speciﬁcally, there is a large Public
Health literature, mainly developed in the U.S., strongly arguing for no negative eﬀect
or for a positive eﬀect of smoking bans on the economic outcomes of the hospitality in-
dustry (Scollo and Lal, 2003 and 2008; Alamar, Glantz (2004 and 2007); Glantz, 2007;
Glantz and Smith 1994 and 1997) and another strand of literature grounded on applied
economics analysis ﬁnding quite diﬀerent results (Pakko 2006a and 2006b; Adda et al.
(2006); Adams and Cotti, 2007). These diﬀerences make it diﬃcult for the policy maker
to draw economic policy considerations, both on the eﬀectiveness of the smoking bans
and on their expected impacts and call for the identiﬁcation of factors that drive such het-
erogeneity in order to establish the scientiﬁc reliability of the empirical ﬁndings. Again,
as emphasized by Heckman et al. (2008) reliably identifying the causal factors underly-
ing smoking behavior (or the turn-over in the hospitality industry) is an important part of
developing scientiﬁcally reliable empirical applications.
The ﬁrst element that should be carefully considered in empirical studies is data.
Large samples are better than small samples, because the large number degrees of free-
dom allow to better assess the causality relationship between the law and the level of
smoking by including an appropriate number of controls. Samples should be represen-
tative and randomly drawn from the underlying population to exclude sample selection
biases. Long longitudinal data set are needed following the behavior of individuals a long
time before and long time after the date of the implementation of the smoking regulation.
As empirical ﬁndings have shown that individual characteristics may drive signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in smoking behavior, micro-data, at the ﬁrm or individual level, including a rich
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set of demographics (such as: age, gender, education, marital status, occupational status
(blue collar versus white collar workers), geographical location) seem to be preferable.
Gender or occupational diﬀerences appear to be important, but many studies do not take
them into account. Thus a rich longitudinal micro-data set accurately measuring not only
the factor being tested, but also the eﬀect of other causal factors, seems to be desirable
in order isolate the eﬀect of the factor being studied. Samples drawn from repeated cross
sections of large nationally representative surveys or longitudinal samples seem to be the
preferable type of data. Longitudinal data also contain all the above mentioned elements,
but may be aﬀected by endogenous attrition causing selection bias. Large national sur-
veys repeated over time are also better than large ad hoc telephone surveys which may
be aﬀected by the so called placebo eﬀect. Moreover, since population based studies em-
ploy a random selection of individuals or ﬁrms they are likely to be more representative
of the population impact of smoking bans than studies that select workers within a ﬁrm
or a small number of ﬁrms. In addition, the surveys are not conducted at the workplace,
thus reducing the likelihood of workers providing socially desirable responses (Levy and
Friend 2003, p. 598).
In order to better identify the economic impact of anti-smoking regulation, additional
research is needed taking into account control factors which have been previously ne-
glected. The impact of such laws on youth smoking has rarely been investigated in the
literature, because much of the literature investigates the impact of workplace bans on
workers who are generally above age 18. The impact of this type of regulation on this
age group’s smoking is, however, rather important, also to evaluate the impact on the
hospitality industry. More generally explicit consideration of age groups in modeling the
impact of smoking bans seems to be important as previous research has emphasized that
the extent of the impact diﬀers by age groups. Accounting for public sentiment against
smoking also seems to be relevant in assessing the impact of smoking bans. Wasserman
(1991) stresses that failure to control for the possibility that unobserved sentiment towards
smoking may bias the coeﬃcient of the smoking ban away from zero. However, only a
few of the later studies take this variable into account. Finally, only very few studies
choose a dynamic speciﬁcation to model smoking consumption. This is surprising given
the well known addictive nature of smoking. The inﬂuential contribution of Becker and
Murphy (1988) on rational addiction has been extensively applied to model the demand of
cigarettes and of other addictive consumption goods. The distinction between addictive
consumption and other consumption is captured by recognizing that, for addictive goods,
current consumption depends on the level of past consumption. If there is habit formation
in the consumption of Tobacco, neglecting the contribution of past consumption as a de-
terminant of current consumption may result in an omitted variable bias in the estimation
of the coeﬃcient measuring the impact of regulation. Despite the popularity of dynamic
models to explain the demand for cigarettes, dynamic speciﬁcations have been used only
in a minority of the papers analyzed here (Chaloupka, 1992; Keeler et al., 1993; Sung et
al., 1994).
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